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Abstract: The objective of the research was to find out some factors which influenced 
earnings management consisted of Information asymmetry, firm size, leverage, 
institutional ownership, and profitability with good corporate governance proxied   with 
independent board of commissioners and audit committee as moderating variable in 
manufacture companies listed in BEI in the period of 2013-2015. The research used 
hypothetical test or explanatory research method. The population was 144 manufacture 
companies listed in BEI, and 106 of them were used as the samples, taken by using 
proportional random sampling technique. The result of the research showed that, 
simultaneously, Information asymmetry, firm size, leverage, institutional ownership, 
and profitability influenced earnings management. Partially, Information asymmetry 
and profitability influenced earnings management, while firm size, leverage, and 
institutional ownership did not have any influence on earnings management. Good 
corporate governance which proxied with independent board of commissioners and 
audit committee was moderating variable in this research in which independent board of 
commissioners and audit committee were not the variables which could moderate the 
influence of Information asymmetry, firm size, leverage, institutional ownership, and 
profitability on earnings management. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Information from financial statements ie profit information is often the target of 
engineering through opportunistic management actions to maximize satisfaction. If a 
condition in which the management fails to achieve the specified profit target, 
management will utilize the flexibility allowed by accounting standards in preparing 
financial statements to modify reported earnings. 
 The case of PT Indofarma occurred when BAPEPAM found indications of 
concealment of important information regarding losses for two consecutive years 
suffered by PT Indofarma Tbk. From the research results, also found evidence in 
between, the value of Goods In Process rated higher than the value that should 
(overstated) in the presentation of the value of inventory in the process in the year 2001 
amounted to Rp 28.87 billion. In addition to these cases there are several other cases of 
earnings management revealed in Indonesia such as cases that occurred at PT. Ades 
Alfindo, PT. Bank Lippo Tbk, PT. Perusahaan Gas Negara, and others (Sulistiawan, 
Januarsi and Alvia, 2011). Financial scandals also occur in developed countries, such as 
the United States (US), such as Enron, Merck, World Com and the majority of other 
companies in the United States (Cornett, Saunders and Tehranian, 2006). 
 The phenomenon of earnings management often occurs when the initial public 
offering or IPO. When companies conduct IPOs, there is often an imbalance of 
information between investors and firms that offer shares (issuers). The Managers can 
prepare financial statements by choosing accounting or accrual methods that will 
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increase profits, and high profits are expected to be highly valued by investors in the 
form of high bid prices (Assih, Hastuti and Parawiyati, 2005). 
 Earnings management occurs when management uses certain decisions in financial 
reporting and the preparation of transactions that alter financial statements, it aims to 
mislead the stakeholders about the conditions of the firm's economic performance, as 
well as to influence the contractual income that controls the reported accounting figures. 
The impact of earnings management is earnings management proven to result in a 
decrease in the relevance of earnings values but has no impact on book value of equity, 
when firms make earnings management through total discretionary accruals (Kusuma, 
2006). 
 According to agency theory, to overcome the problem of nonconformity of interest 
between principal and agent can be done through good corporate governance 
(Midiastuty & Machfoedz, 2003). As revealed by Veronica and Bachtiar (2004) good 
corporate governance is one way to control opportunistic actions undertaken by 
management. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Earnings management 
Earnings management can be interpreted as an act of determining profit in such a way 
as to play out the revenue and expense items in the profit and loss statement either 
through the use of alternative election methods or through operations and other actions 
as long as it does not violate the existing standard provisions. In this research the ratio 
used in determining earnings management is discretionary accruals calculated using 
Modified Jones Model. 
 
Information Asymmetry and Bid-ask Spread Theory 
Information asymmetry is a situation in which managers have access to information on 
prospects companies in the future compared to shareholders or other stakeholders. Bid-
ask Spread is the difference between the bid price that causes the investor to be willing 
to buy a certain stock with the lowest asking price that causes the investor to sell their 
shares. The use of bid-ask spreads as a proxy for information asymmetry due to capital 
market mechanisms, capital market actors also face agency problems (Komalasari 
2001). 
 
Firm Size 
Mukhlasin (2002) states the size of the company is the proxy of operational volatility 
and inventory controlability that should be in economies of scale the size of the 
company shows the achievement of current operations and inventory control. The size 
of the company can be classified by: total assets, stock market value, total sales and 
others. 
 
Leverage 
Leverage is the ability of a company to use assets or funds that have a fixed burden 
(debt) effectively so as to obtain an optimal level of business income (Arrita, 2004). 
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Institutional ownership 
Institutional ownership is the ownership of shares of companies owned by institutions 
or institutions such as insurance companies, banks, and other institutional ownership 
(Tarjo, 2008). 
 
Profitability 
Profitability is the ratio used in measuring the effectiveness of management based on 
the profit obtained from a company from its operational activities. Agustina (2014) 
argues that profitability is a company's ability to generate profits in an effort to increase 
shareholder value. 
Good Corporate Governance 
Independent Board of Commissioners 
Independent Board of Commissioners are members of the board of commissioners who 
are not affiliated with the management, other members of the board of commissioners 
and controlling shareholders and are free from any business relationship or other 
relationship that may affect their ability to act independently or act solely for the benefit 
of the company (KNKG, 2006). 
 
Audit Committee 
The audit committee is the additional organs required for performing the functions of 
the directors in carrying out the management of the company and performing important 
tasks related to the financial reporting system (KNKG, 2006). 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The form of conceptual framework can be described as follows: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Conceptual framework 
From the conceptual framework above, the researcher intends to examine the effect of 
information asymmetry (AI), firm size (UP), leverage (LEV), institutional ownership 
(KI) and profitability (PR) to earnings management (M) with good corporate 
Information asymmetry (X1) 
Firm Size (X2) 
Earnings management 
(Y) 
Leverage (X3) 
Institutional ownership (X4) 
GCG/audit committee (Z2) 
Profitability (X5) 
GCG/ Independent Board 
of Commissioners (Z1) 
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governance proxied   with independent board of commissioners (DKI) and audit 
committee (KA) as moderating variable so the hypothesis in this research is as follows: 
1. Information asymmetry, firm size, leverage, institutional ownership and profitability 
affect simultaneously and partially toward earnings management. 
2. Good corporate governance mechanisms with Independent Board of Commissioners 
indicators are able to moderate the relationship of information asymmetry, firm size, 
leverage, institutional ownership and profitability with earnings management. 
3. Good corporate governance mechanisms with audit committee indicators able to 
moderate the relationship of information asymmetry, firm size, leverage, institutional 
ownership and profitability with earnings management. 
 
Research Methods 
This research is more specifically intended as research of hypothesis testing or 
explanation research to test the hypothesis that explain the phenomenon in the form of 
relationship between variables so that it can give answer to the problem (Indriantoro and 
Supomo, 2002). This research is conducted on Indonesia Stock Exchange which 
provides audited financial report data by accessing and downloading the official website 
of Indonesia Stock Exchange through www.idx.co.id and ICMD website. The 
population in this research are all manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (BEI) amounted to 144 are grouped by sector of the company. 
Sampling technique using proportional stratified random sampling method. The 
research data was processed using SPSS support. 
 
Data Analysis Method 
Data analysis is needed to answer the formulation of the problem and test the hypothesis 
that has been proposed, the data analysis technique used is a statistical analysis tool that 
is multiple linear regression analysis intended to see the relationship pattern of more 
than one independent variable to the dependent variable and its processing using SPSS 
program tools such as descriptive statistics, classical assumption test, multiple linear 
regression and hypothesis test. 
 
III RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
AI 318 .0000 1.9772 .597261 .3673182 
UP 318 21.3225 33.1341 2.833715E1 1.6517603 
LEV 318 .0219 3.0291 .511542 .3401642 
KI 318 .1000 1.0000 .960597 .1280690 
PR 318 -1.5970 1.6313 .073005 .2312895 
M 318 -.3301 .3143 .021826 .0867595 
DKI 318 .0000 1.0000 .409250 .1609891 
KA 318 .0000 5.0000 2.795597E0 .9155403 
Valid N (listwise) 318     
Sumber: Data diolah SPSS 
The table above shows the measurement of variables from N as many as 318 (three 
hundred eighteen) in which all variables show varying data. 
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Normality Test 
Normality Test 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
  Unstandardized Residual 
N 318 
Normal Parameters
a
 Mean .0000000 
Std. Deviation .08394729 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute .063 
Positive .052 
Negative -.063 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.128 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .157 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
Based on the table can be seen that a significant value of 0.157 greater than 0.05 it can 
be concluded that the data is normally distributed. 
 
Multicolinearity Test 
Multicolinearity Test 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .061 .087  .698 .486   
AI .028 .013 .119 2.148 .032 .986 1.014 
UP -.003 .003 -.062 -1.118 .264 .985 1.016 
LEV .015 .014 .058 1.037 .301 .971 1.030 
KI .035 .038 .052 .940 .348 .972 1.029 
PR -.073 .021 -.194 -3.490 .001 .971 1.030 
a. Dependent Variable: Earnings Management 
From the above table it is found that all independent variables have Tolerance value 
greater than 0.1 and VIF value less than 10. Thus in the regression model not found 
multicolonierity problem. 
 
Heteroscedasticity Test 
Glejser Test 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .139 .056  2.471 .014 
AI -.013 .008 -.084 -1.493 .136 
UP -.002 .002 -.075 -1.324 .187 
LEV .005 .009 .029 .513 .608 
KI -.004 .024 -.008 -.148 .883 
PR .021 .015 .078 1.371 .171 
a. Dependent Variable: AbsRes_1    
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From the table above can be seen that the significant value of all independent variables 
above 0.05, it can be concluded that there is no heterokedaktisitas in this research. 
Autocorrelation Test 
Autocorrelation Test 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .253
a
 .064 .049 .0846173 2.042 
a. Predictors: (Constant), PR, AI, UP, KI, LEV 
b. Dependent Variable: Earnings Management 
 
From the autocorrelation test, the DW value of 2,042 values will be compared with the 
value of the table using the significance value of 5%, the sample number 200 (n) and the 
number of independent variables 5 (k = 5) then du = 1.820 so that 1.820 <2.042 <2.180 
(4 - du) and it can be concluded there is no autocorrelation. 
 
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .061 .087  .698 .486 
AI .028 .013 .119 2.148 .032 
UP -.003 .003 -.062 -1.118 .264 
LEV .015 .014 .058 1.037 .301 
KI .035 .038 .052 .940 .348 
PR -.073 .021 -.194 -3.490 .001 
a. Dependent Variable: Earnings Management 
Based on the above table can be made regression equation as follows: 
 Y = 0.061 + 0.028AI - 0.003UP + 0.015LEV + 0.033KI - 0.073PR + ei 
 
The First Hypothesis Testing 
Determination Coefficient Test 
Determination Coefficient Test 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .253
a
 .064 .049 .0846173 
a. Predictors: (Constant), PR, AI, UP, KI, LEV 
Based on the above table obtained Adjusted R Square number of 0.049 or (4.9%). This 
means that as much as 4.9% of the dependent variable (earnings management) can be 
explained by independent variables while the rest of 95.1% is explained by other 
variables not included in this research. 
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F Test 
F Test 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .152 5 .030 4.251 .001
a
 
Residual 2.234 312 .007   
Total 2.386 317    
a. Predictors: (Constant), PR, AI, UP, KI, LEV 
b. Dependent Variable: Earnings Management 
Based on the table obtained the value of F arithmetic of 4.251 greater than F table 2.26 
and significant value of F test of 0.001 smaller than alpha 0.05 so it can be concluded 
that simultaneously asymmetry information (AI), firm size (UP), leverage ( LEV), 
institutional ownership (KI) and profitability (PR) have a significant effect on earnings 
management (M). 
 
t Test 
       t Test 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .061 .087  .698 .486 
AI .028 .013 .119 2.148 .032 
UP -.003 .003 -.062 -1.118 .264 
LEV .015 .014 .058 1.037 .301 
KI .035 .038 .052 .940 .348 
PR -.073 .021 -.194 -3.490 .001 
a. Dependent Variable: Earnings Management 
Based on the test results in the above table, the partial variable asymmetry of 
information (AI) and variable profitability (PR) has a significant value smaller than 
alpha 0.05 so it can be concluded that information asymmetry and profitability have a 
significant effect on earnings management (M). The firm size (UP), leverage (LEV) and 
institutional ownership (KI) have significant value greater than alpha 0,05 so it can be 
concluded that firm size of leverage and institutional ownership have no effect on 
earnings management (M). 
 
The Second Hypothesis Testing 
First Residual Test Results 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .102 .007  14.860 .000 
M .014 .077 .010 .176 .860 
a. Dependent Variable: AbsRes_1 
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From the above equation the coefficient value of the parameter is positive 0,014 and not 
significant because significant value of earnings management 0,860 bigger than alpha 
0,05, hence concluded that independent board is not a variable that can moderate 
influence between information asymmetry, firm size, leverage, institutional ownership 
and profitability to earnings management. The board of independent commissioners is 
considered a moderating variable if the value of negative coefficient and significant 
value is less than alpha 0.05. 
The Third Hypothesis Testing 
   Second Residual Test Results 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .531 .041  12.809 .000 
M -.321 .464 -.039 -.692 .490 
a. Dependent Variable: AbsRes_1 
From the above table, the coefficient value of the parameter is negative 0,321 and not 
significant because significant value of earnings management 0,490 bigger than alpha 
0,05, hence concluded that audit committee is not a variable that can moderate influence 
between information asymmetry, firm size, leverage, institutional ownership and 
profitability to earnings management. The audit committee is considered a moderating 
variable if the value of negative coefficient and significant value is less than alpha 0.05. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions 
Based on the results of research that has been described previously it can be concluded 
as follows: 
1. Information asymmetry, firm size, leverage, institutional ownership and profitability 
simultaneously affect earnings management. Partially information asymmetry and 
profitability have an effect on earnings management while firm size, leverage and 
institutional ownership have no effect to earnings management. 
2. Independent board of commissioners is not a variable that can moderate the 
relationship of information asymmetry, firm size, leverage, institutional ownership 
and profitability with earnings management. 
3. The audit committee is not a variable that can moderate the relationship of 
information asymmetry, firm size, leverage, institutional ownership and profitability 
with earnings management. 
 
Limitations of Research 
Some limitations in this study, among others: 
1. The sample of this study is only manufacturing companies listed on the BEI period 
of 3 years ie 2013 - 2015. This causes the results of research can not be generalized 
to other types of companies. 
2. The moderating variable of good corporate governance uses only 2 proxies ie 
independent board of commissioners and audit committee, so it may not reflect good 
corporate governance as a whole. 
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Recommendations 
1. For further research it is advisable to use samples from other types of companies 
such as banking, communications, services and others. 
2. In subsequent research using good corporate governance as moderating it is 
recommended to use other proxies such as managerial ownership, audit quality and 
others. 
3. Further research is suggested to use different proxies to measure firm size such as 
total sales and others to know the results obtained when using different proxies. 
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